United Nations S/2017/774

Security Council

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14 September 2017
English
Original: Russian

Letter dated 12 September 2017 from the Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to transmit herewith information bulletins from the Russian Federation Ministry of Defence regarding the status of implementation of the memorandum on the creation of de-escalation areas in the Syrian Arab Republic for the period 9-12 September 2017 (see annex).

I should be grateful if the present letter and its annex could be circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) V. **Nebenzia**

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Annex to the letter dated 12 September 2017 from the Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

Information bulletin from the Russian Federation Ministry of Defence regarding the status of implementation of the memorandum on the creation of de-escalation areas (9 September 2017)

Observance of the ceasefire regime

Monitoring groups have continued to monitor observance of the ceasefire regime as part of implementing the memorandum on the creation of de-escalation areas in the Syrian Arab Republic, signed by the Russian Federation, the Republic of Turkey and the Islamic Republic of Iran on 4 May 2017.

The situation in the de-escalation areas has been assessed as stable.

Over the past 24 hours, the Russian representative office of the Russian and Turkish Joint Commission reviewing issues related to violations of the ceasefire regime has reported eight incidents of gunfire: five in Aleppo governorate and three in Qunaytirah governorate.

The Turkish representative office has reported four violations in the following governorates: two in Damascus, one in Hama and one in Homs.

Most of the incidents of small arms being fired indiscriminately have been reported in areas controlled by fighters of the terrorist groups Nusrah Front and Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL).

Provision of humanitarian aid to the population of the Syrian Arab Republic

Over the past 24 hours, the Centre for Reconciliation of Opposing Sides in the Syrian Arab Republic has not carried out any humanitarian operations.

No medical assistance had been provided over the past 24 hours.

Reconciliation of opposing sides

Over the past 24 hours, no ceasefire agreements have been signed.

The number of populated areas that have joined the reconciliation process is unchanged — it is still 2,233.

Negotiations on joining the ceasefire regime continued with armed opposition groups in Aleppo, Damascus, Hama, Homs and Qunaytirah governorates.

Over the past 24 hours, four ceasefire application forms have been signed with the leaders of illegal armed groups operating in de-escalation area No. 1. The number of armed groups that have announced their commitment to accepting and fulfilling the terms of the ceasefire has increased to 233.

Information bulletin from the Russian Federation Ministry of Defence regarding the status of implementation of the memorandum on the creation of de-escalation areas (10 September 2017)

Observance of the ceasefire regime

Monitoring groups have continued to monitor observance of the ceasefire regime as part of implementing the memorandum on the creation of de-escalation areas in the Syrian Arab Republic, signed by the Russian Federation, the Republic of Turkey and the Islamic Republic of Iran on 4 May 2017.

The situation in the de-escalation areas has been assessed as stable.

Over the past 24 hours, the Russian representative office of the Russian and Turkish Joint Commission reviewing issues related to violations of the ceasefire regime has reported six incidents of gunfire in the following governorates: three in Damascus, two in Aleppo and one in Dar'a.

The Turkish representative office has not reported any violations.

Most of the incidents of small arms being fired indiscriminately have been reported in areas controlled by fighters of the terrorist groups Nusrah Front and ISIL.

Provision of humanitarian aid to the population of the Syrian Arab Republic

Over the past 24 hours, the Centre for Reconciliation of Opposing Sides in the Syrian Arab Republic has carried out two humanitarian operations: the delivery of 2.2 tons of food to the local population of Wadhah in Aleppo governorate; and the delivery of 1.6 tons of food to the local population of Tall Amiri in Homs governorate.

Over the past 24 hours, medical assistance has been provided to 393 residents.

In total, medical assistance has been provided to 55,807 residents.

Reconciliation of opposing sides

Over the past 24 hours, no ceasefire agreements have been signed.

The number of populated areas that have joined the reconciliation process is unchanged — it is still 2,233.

Negotiations on joining the ceasefire regime continued with armed opposition groups in Aleppo, Damascus, Hama, Homs and Qunaytirah governorates.

The number of armed groups that have announced their commitment to accepting and fulfilling the terms of the ceasefire is unchanged — it is still 233.

Information bulletin from the Russian Federation Ministry of Defence regarding the status of implementation of the memorandum on the creation of de-escalation areas (11 September 2017)

Observance of the ceasefire regime

Monitoring groups have continued to monitor observance of the ceasefire regime as part of implementing the memorandum on the creation of de-escalation areas in the Syrian Arab Republic, signed by the Russian Federation, the Republic of Turkey and the Islamic Republic of Iran on 4 May 2017.

The situation in the de-escalation areas has been assessed as stable.

Over the past 24 hours, the Russian representative office of the Russian and Turkish Joint Commission reviewing issues related to violations of the ceasefire regime has reported three incidents of gunfire in the following governorates: one in Aleppo, one in Hama and one in Qunaytirah.

The Turkish representative office has reported seven violations: five in Damascus governorate and two in Hama governorate.

Most of the incidents of small arms being fired indiscriminately have been reported in areas controlled by fighters of the terrorist groups Nusrah Front and ISIL.

Provision of humanitarian aid to the population of the Syrian Arab Republic

Over the past 24 hours, the Centre for Reconciliation of Opposing Sides in the Syrian Arab Republic has carried out three humanitarian operations: the delivery of 3.3 tons of food to the local population of Dayr al-Zawr in Dayr al-Zawr governorate; the delivery of 4.4 tons of food to the local population of Rastan in Homs governorate; and the delivery of 50 backpacks to pupils from Zabdin in Damascus governorate.

Over the past 24 hours, medical assistance has been provided to 53 residents.

In total, medical assistance has been provided to 55,817 residents.

Reconciliation of opposing sides

Over the past 24 hours, no ceasefire agreements have been signed.

The number of populated areas that have joined the reconciliation process is unchanged — it is still 2,233.

Negotiations on joining the ceasefire regime continued with armed opposition groups in Aleppo, Damascus, Hama, Homs and Qunaytirah governorates.

The number of armed groups that have announced their commitment to accepting and fulfilling the terms of the ceasefire is unchanged — it is still 233.

Information bulletin from the Russian Federation Ministry of Defence regarding the status of implementation of the memorandum on the creation of de-escalation areas (12 September 2017)

Observance of the ceasefire regime

Monitoring groups have continued to monitor observance of the ceasefire regime as part of implementing the memorandum on the creation of de-escalation areas in the Syrian Arab Republic, signed by the Russian Federation, the Republic of Turkey and the Islamic Republic of Iran on 4 May 2017.

The situation in the de-escalation areas has been assessed as stable.

Over the past 24 hours, the Russian representative office of the Russian and Turkish Joint Commission reviewing issues related to violations of the ceasefire regime has reported six incidents of gunfire in the following governorates: four in Damascus, one in Aleppo and one in Dar'a.

The Turkish representative office has reported five violations: four in Damascus governorate and one in Dar'a governorate.

Most of the incidents of small arms being fired indiscriminately have been reported in areas controlled by fighters of the terrorist groups Nusrah Front and ISIL.

Provision of humanitarian aid to the population of the Syrian Arab Republic

The United Nations carried out one humanitarian operation: the delivery of food and medicine with a total weight of 114 tons to Tall Shihab in Dar'a governorate.

Reconciliation of opposing sides

Over the past 24 hours, two ceasefire agreements have been signed with Ba'rabu and Hasabah in Idlib governorate.

The number of populated areas that have joined the reconciliation process has increased to 2,235.

Negotiations on joining the ceasefire regime continued with armed opposition groups in Aleppo, Damascus, Hama, Homs and Qunaytirah governorates.

The number of armed groups that have announced their commitment to accepting and fulfilling the terms of the ceasefire is unchanged — it is still 233.

United Nations S/2017/775

Security Council

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14 September 2017

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United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland: draft resolution

The Security Council,

Recalling its resolution 1970 (2011) and all its subsequent resolutions on Libya,

Reaffirming its strong commitment to the sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity and national unity of Libya,

Taking note of the report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL) (S/2017/726),

Expressing its strong support for the ongoing efforts of UNSMIL, *welcoming* the appointment of the new Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG) and underscoring the importance of the United Nations' central role, to facilitate a Libyan-led political solution to the challenges facing Libya,

Recalling resolution 2259 (2015) which endorses the Rome Communiqué of 13 December 2015 to support the Government of National Accord (GNA) as the sole legitimate government of Libya, with Prime Minister Fayez Sarraj as the leader of the Presidency Council,

Reiterating its support for the full implementation of the Libyan Political Agreement (LPA) of Skhirat, Morocco signed on 17 December 2015 to form a GNA consisting of the Presidency Council and Cabinet supported by the other institutions of state including the House of Representatives and State Council,

Welcoming the endorsement in principle of the LPA by the House of Representatives on 25 January 2016 and the subsequent meetings of the Libyan Political Dialogue which reaffirmed its commitment to uphold the LPA,

Emphasizing the importance of continued inclusiveness, *strongly encouraging* the GNA to engage with all parties in support of reconciliation and to enhance political outreach throughout Libya, and *urging* all parties and institutions in Libya to engage constructively with the LPA in good faith and with sustained political will,

Welcoming recent efforts to strengthen an inclusive political dialogue among all Libyans, including important efforts by Libya's neighbours, international partners and regional organizations, and the meeting in Paris on 25 July 2017 and the Joint declaration issued after the meeting as set out in a Security Council press statement on 27 July 2017, within the framework of the LPA endorsed by resolution

2259 (2015), and *supporting* the Secretary-General's call to consolidate the various initiatives under the leadership of the United Nations,

Looking forward to a comprehensive strategy and action plan for the engagement of the United Nations system in Libya, and to the high level event to be held in the margins of the seventy-second session of the General Assembly in support of the central role of the United Nations in facilitating a Libyan-led political dialogue to build security, stability and national unity in Libya,

Urging the full, equal and effective participation of women in all activities relating to the democratic transition, conflict resolution and peacebuilding, *supporting* the efforts of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General to facilitate wider engagement and participation of women from across the spectrum of Libyan society in the political process and public institutions, and *calling on* the Libyan authorities to prevent and respond to sexual violence in conflict, including addressing impunity for sexual violence crimes in line with relevant Security Council resolutions, including resolutions 1325 (2000), 2106 (2013), 2122 (2013), 2242 (2015) and 2331 (2016),

Reaffirming the need for all parties in Libya to engage constructively with the United Nations and refrain from any actions that could undermine UN-mediated political dialogue and *reiterating* that there can be no military solution in Libya,

Further reaffirming that all parties must comply with their obligations under international humanitarian law and international human rights law, as applicable, and *emphasizing* that those responsible for violations of international humanitarian law and violations and abuses of human rights must be held accountable,

Fully supporting the Vienna Communiqué of 16 May 2016 which urged all parties to work constructively towards the completion of the transitional institutional framework and welcomed the creation of the Presidential Guard by the Presidency Council, *encouraging* further progress towards establishing the Presidential Guard, and *stressing* that ensuring security and defending Libya from terrorism must be the task of unified and strengthened national security forces under the sole authority of the GNA in accordance with the LPA,

Further recalling resolution 2259 (2015) which called on Member States to cease support to and official contact with parallel institutions claiming to be the legitimate authority, but which were outside the LPA, as specified by the Agreement,

Encouraging the GNA to finalize interim security arrangements for stabilizing Libya as a critical step towards tackling Libya's political, security, humanitarian, economic and institutional challenges and *recognising* the need for the GNA to plan for disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration of armed groups in that regard, and *encouraging* the GNA to continue stabilization efforts in affected cities including in Sirte and Benghazi to consolidate gains against terrorism,

Expressing grave concern at the deteriorating humanitarian situation in Libya including deteriorating living standards and provision of basic services,

Taking note of the economic dialogue taking place in Libya and the region and *welcoming* the commitment of the representatives of the Presidency Council, the Government of National Accord, the Central Bank of Libya, the Audit Bureau and the National Oil Corporation to alleviate urgently the suffering of the Libyan people by speeding up the delivery of public services, increasing oil production, and improving liquidity,

Reiterating its request that all Member States fully support the efforts of the SRSG and work with the Libyan authorities and UNSMIL to develop a coordinated

package of support to build the capacity of the GNA, in line with Libyan priorities and in response to requests for assistance, and *further reiterating* its call upon all parties to cooperate fully with the activities of UNSMIL, including taking necessary steps to ensure the security and unhindered movement for the United Nations and associated personnel,

Welcoming the recommendations of the Strategic Assessment Review to enhance UNSMIL's ability to support the political process and to strengthen coordination across UNSMIL and the United Nations country team,

Reiterating its concern at the smuggling of migrants and human trafficking through Libya, and *welcoming* the work of UNSMIL in coordinating and supporting the provision of humanitarian assistance for refugees and migrants through the UN Country Team, particularly the UN High Commissioner for Refugees and the International Organization for Migration,

Encouraging UNSMIL to continue to prioritize its tasks and mediation efforts in full consultation with the Presidency Council and other Libyan institutions and in response to its needs and the evolving situation in the country,

Underscoring the importance of ensuring that existing sanctions measures are fully implemented and that cooperation continues with Libyan authorities to ensure violations are reported to the United Nations Sanctions Committee,

Recalling its determination in resolution 2213 (2015) that the situation in Libya continues to constitute a threat to international peace and security,

1. *Decides* to extend until 15 September 2018 the mandate of UNSMIL, under the leadership of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General, as an integrated special political mission, in full accordance with the principles of national ownership to exercise mediation and good offices to support:

(i) an inclusive political process within the framework of the Libyan Political Agreement;

(ii) continued implementation of the Libyan Political Agreement;

(iii) consolidation of the governance, security and economic arrangements of the Government of National Accord; and

(iv) subsequent phases of the Libyan transition process;

2. *Further decides* that UNSMIL, within operational and security constraints, should undertake the following tasks:

(i) support to key Libyan institutions;

(ii) support, on request, for the provision of essential services, and delivery of humanitarian assistance and in accordance with humanitarian principles;

(iii) human rights monitoring and reporting;

(iv) support for securing uncontrolled arms and related materiel and countering their proliferation; and

(v) coordination of international assistance, and provision of advice and assistance to GNA-led efforts to stabilise post-conflict zones, including those liberated from Da'esh;

3. *Requests* the Secretary-General to develop a series of detailed objectives for the implementation of UNSMIL's mandated tasks, and to report on progress towards these objectives in his regular reporting;

4. *Requests* UNSMIL to take fully into account a gender perspective throughout its mandate and to assist the GNA in ensuring the full and effective participation of women in the democratic transition, reconciliation efforts, the security sector and in national institutions in line with resolution 1325 (2000);

5. *Recognizes* that since 30 March 2016 UNSMIL has facilitated a consistent presence in Libya to support the Presidency Council and Temporary Security Committee and *encourages* UNSMIL to continue working towards re-establishing a presence in Tripoli and other parts of Libya, through a phased return, as security conditions allow and to make the necessary security arrangements to this effect;

6. *Welcomes* the recommendations from the Secretary-General's Strategic Assessment Review for UNSMIL to implement a comprehensive political strategy as well as for greater integration and strategic coordination of UNSMIL and United Nations agencies, funds and programmes in Libya to support GNA-led efforts towards the stabilisation of Libya;

7. *Requests* the Secretary-General to continue to report to the Security Council on the implementation of this resolution at least every 60 days;

8. *Requests* the Secretary-General to report as necessary following consultations with the Libyan authorities on recommendations for UNSMIL's support to the subsequent phases of the Libyan transition process and UNSMIL's security arrangements;

9. *Decides* to remain actively seized of the matter.

United Nations S/2017/776

Security Council

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Draft resolution

The Security Council,

Welcoming the major accomplishments achieved, with the support of the United Nations Mission in Colombia, in the laying down of arms process, as called for in the "Final Agreement for Ending the Conflict and Building a Stable and Lasting Peace" (the Final Agreement) (S/2017/272) between the Government of Colombia and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC-EP), signed in Bogotá, Colombia, on 24 November 2016, and adopted by the Colombian Congress on 30 November 2016,

Recalling resolution 2366 (2017) which established a second political mission in Colombia (the United Nations Verification Mission in Colombia) to verify implementation by the Government of Colombia and FARC-EP of sections 3.2 and 3.4 of the Final Agreement as called for in section 6.3.3 of the Final Agreement,

Welcoming the announcement by the Government of Colombia and the National Liberation Army (ELN) of 4 September 2017 that they will enter into a temporary bilateral ceasefire from 1 October until 12 January 2018,

Having considered the Secretary-General's report of 30 August 2017 to the Security Council (S/2017/745),

1. *Welcomes* the Secretary-General's report S/2017/745 and *approves* the recommendations therein regarding the size, operational aspects and mandate of the United Nations Verification Mission in Colombia.

17-16110 (E) 140917

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United Nations S/2017/777

Security Council

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Note by the President of the Security Council

At its 7488th meeting, held on 20 July 2015 in connection with the item entitled "Non-proliferation", the Security Council adopted its resolution 2231 (2015).

In paragraph 4 of the resolution, the Security Council requested the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency to provide regular updates to the Council on implementation by the Islamic Republic of Iran of its commitments under the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action and to report at any time any issue of concern directly affecting fulfilment of those commitments.

Accordingly, the President herewith circulates the report of the Director General dated 31 August 2017 (see annex).

17-16031 (E) 150917

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Annex

Letter dated 31 August 2017 from the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency addressed to the President of the Security Council

I have the honour to enclose herewith the report submitted to the Board of Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency (see enclosure).

I should be grateful if you would bring the present letter and the enclosed report to the attention of all members of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Yukiya **Amano**

Enclosure

[Original: Arabic, Chinese, English, French, Russian and Spanish]

Verification and monitoring in the Islamic Republic of Iran in light of United Nations Security Council resolution 2231 (2015)*

Report by the Director General

A. Introduction

1. This report of the Director General to the Board of Governors and, in parallel, to the United Nations Security Council (Security Council), is on the Islamic Republic of Iran's (Iran's) implementation of its nuclear-related commitments under the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) and on matters related to verification and monitoring in Iran in light of Security Council resolution 2231 (2015). It also provides information on financial matters, and the Agency's consultations and exchanges of information with the Joint Commission, established by the JCPOA.

B. Background

2. On 14 July 2015, China, France, Germany, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom, the United States of America, with the High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (E3/EU+3) and Iran agreed on the JCPOA. On 20 July 2015, the Security Council adopted resolution 2231 (2015), in which, inter alia, it requested the Director General to "undertake the necessary verification and monitoring of Iran's nuclear-related commitments for the full duration of those commitments under the JCPOA".[1] In August 2015, the Board of Governors authorized the Director General to implement the necessary verification and monitoring of Iran's nuclear-related commitments as set out in the JCPOA, and report accordingly, for the full duration of those commitments in light of Security Council resolution 2231 (2015), subject to the availability of funds and consistent with the Agency's standard safeguards practices. The Board of Governors also authorized the Agency to consult and exchange information with the Joint Commission, as set out in GOV/2015/53 and Corr.1.

3. In December 2016 and January 2017, the Director General shared with Member States nine documents,[2] developed and endorsed by all participants of the Joint Commission, providing clarifications for the implementation of Iran's nuclear-related measures as set out in the JCPOA for its duration.[3]

4. The estimated cost to the Agency for the implementation of Iran's Additional Protocol and for verifying and monitoring Iran's nuclear-related commitments as set out in the JCPOA is €9.2 million per annum. For 2017, extrabudgetary funding is necessary for €6.2 million of the €9.2 million.[4] As of 28 August 2017, €8.4 million

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* Circulated to the Board of Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency under the symbol GOV/2017/35.

[1] The actions requested of the Director General by the Security Council as contained in resolution 2231 (2015) are set out in GOV/2015/53 and Corr.1, para. 8.

[2] Reproduced in INFCIRC/907 and INFCIRC/907/Add.1.

[3] GOV/2017/10, para. 3.

[4] The cost of the provisional application of Iran's Additional Protocol (€3.0 million) is being met from the regular budget (GC(60)/2).

of extrabudgetary funding was available to meet the cost of JCPOA related activities for 2017 and beyond.

C. JCPOA verification and monitoring activities

5. Since 16 January 2016 (JCPOA Implementation Day), the Agency has verified and monitored Iran's implementation of its nuclear-related commitments in accordance with the modalities set out in the JCPOA,[5] consistent with the Agency's standard safeguards practices, and in an impartial and objective manner.[6,7] The Agency reports the following for the period since the issuance of the Director General's previous quarterly report.[8]

C.1. Activities related to heavy water and reprocessing

6. Iran has not pursued the construction of the Arak heavy water research reactor (IR-40 Reactor) based on its original design.[9,10] Iran has not produced or tested natural uranium pellets, fuel pins or fuel assemblies specifically designed for the support of the IR-40 Reactor as originally designed, and all existing natural uranium pellets and fuel assemblies have remained in storage under continuous Agency monitoring (paras 3 and 10).[11]

7. Iran has continued to inform the Agency about the inventory of heavy water in Iran and the production of heavy water at the Heavy Water Production Plant (HWPP)[12] and allowed the Agency to monitor the quantities of Iran's heavy water stocks and the amount of heavy water produced at the HWPP (para. 15).

8. In a letter dated 6 June 2017, Iran informed the Agency of its plan to transfer about 19 tonnes of heavy water out of Iran. Prior to the transfer, the Agency verified and sealed 19.1 metric tonnes of nuclear grade heavy water that Iran was preparing for such transfer. On 18 June 2017, Iran informed the Agency that the heavy water had reached its destination outside Iran. From 16 to 20 July 2017, the Agency verified the quantity of 19.1 metric tonnes of the nuclear grade heavy water at the destination outside Iran.

9. As previously reported, on 16 May 2017, the Agency verified that the HWPP was shut down.[13] In a letter dated 11 June 2017, Iran informed the Agency that the operator of the HWPP intended to "start up" the plant on 17 June 2017. On 7 August

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[5] Including the clarifications referred to in para. 3 of this report.

[6] GOV/2016/8, para. 6.

[7] Note by the Secretariat, 2016/Note 5.

[8] GOV/2017/24.

[9] The calandria was removed from the reactor and rendered inoperable during preparation for Implementation Day and has been retained in Iran (GOV/INF/2016/1, Arak heavy water research reactor, paras 3(ii) and 3(iii)).

[10] As indicated previously (GOV/2017/24, footnote 10), Iran has changed the name of the facility to the Khondab Heavy Water Research Reactor.

[11] The paragraph references in parentheses throughout Sections C and D of this report correspond to the paragraphs of 'Annex I — Nuclear-related measures' of the JCPOA.

[12] HWPP is a facility for the production of heavy water which, according to the design information provided by Iran to the Agency on 25 January 2016, has a nominal capacity of 16 tonnes of nuclear grade heavy water per year and an actual capacity of "about 20 tonnes" of nuclear grade heavy water per year. In response to the Agency's request of 12 May 2017 (GOV/2017/24, footnote 12), Iran informed the Agency, in a letter dated 18 June 2017, that the "maximum annual capacity of the Heavy Water Production Plant (HWPP) is 20 Tons".

[13] GOV/2017/24, para. 7.

2017, the Agency verified that the plant was in operation and that Iran's stock of heavy water was 111.0 metric tonnes.

10. Throughout the reporting period, Iran had no more than 130 metric tonnes of heavy water (para. 14).

11. Iran has not carried out activities related to reprocessing at the Tehran Research Reactor (TRR) and the Molybdenum, Iodine and Xenon Radioisotope Production (MIX) Facility or at any of the other facilities it has declared to the Agency (paras 18 and 21).[14]

C.2. Activities related to enrichment and fuel

12. At the Fuel Enrichment Plant (FEP) at Natanz, there have been no more than 5060 IR-1 centrifuges installed in 30 cascades, which remain in the configurations in the operating units at the time the JCPOA was agreed (para. 27). Iran has withdrawn 57 IR-1 centrifuges from those held in storage[15] for the replacement of damaged or failed IR-1 centrifuges installed at FEP (para. 29.1).

13. Iran has continued the enrichment of UF_6 at FEP.[16] Iran has not enriched uranium above 3.67% U-235 (para. 28).

14. Throughout the reporting period, Iran's total enriched uranium stockpile has not exceeded 300 kg of UF_6 enriched up to 3.67% U-235 (or the equivalent in different chemical forms) (para. 56). The quantity of 300 kg of UF_6 corresponds to 202.8 kg of uranium.[17]

15. As of 21 August 2017, the quantity of Iran's uranium enriched up to 3.67% U-235 was 88.4 kg,[18] based on the JCPOA and decisions of the Joint Commission.[19]

16. At the Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant (FFEP), 1044 IR-1 centrifuges have been maintained in one wing (Unit 2) of the facility (para. 46), of which 1042 IR-1 centrifuges have remained installed in six cascades and two IR-1 centrifuges have remained installed separately for the purpose of conducting "initial research and R&D activities related to stable isotope production".[20] Throughout the reporting period, Iran has not conducted any uranium enrichment or related research and development (R&D) activities, and there has not been any nuclear material at the plant (para. 45).

17. All centrifuges and associated infrastructure in storage have remained under continuous Agency monitoring (paras 29, 47, 48 and 70).[21] The Agency has continued to have regular access to relevant buildings at Natanz, including all of FEP and the Pilot Fuel Enrichment Plant (PFEP), and performed daily access upon Agency request (para. 71). The Agency has also continued to have regular access to FFEP, including daily access upon Agency request (para. 51).

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[14] Including hot cells at TRR and the MIX facility and shielded cells, referred to in the decision of the Joint Commission of 14 January 2016 (INFCIRC/907).

[15] Para. 17 of this report.

[16] Under the JCPOA, "[f]or 15 years the Natanz enrichment site will be the sole location for all of Iran's uranium enrichment related activities including safeguarded R&D" (para. 72).

[17] Considering the standard atomic weight of uranium and fluorine.

[18] Comprising 77.8 kg of uranium in the form of UF_6; 1.0 kg of uranium in the form of UO_2; 5.5 kg of uranium in fuel assemblies and rods; 0.3 kg of uranium as hold up in process lines; and 3.8 kg of uranium in liquid and solid scrap.

[19] Decisions of the Joint Commission of 6 January and 18 December 2016 (INFCIRC/907), and 10 January 2017 (INFCIRC/907/Add.1).

[20] GOV/2016/46, para. 12.

[21] GOV/2016/46, footnote 15.

18. Iran has conducted its enrichment activities in line with its long term enrichment and R&D enrichment plan, as provided to the Agency on 16 January 2016 (para. 52).

19. On 20 August 2017, the Agency verified that all irradiated TRR fuel elements in Iran have a measured dose rate of no less than 1 rem/hour (at one metre in air).

20. Iran has not operated any of its declared facilities for the purpose of re-converting fuel plates or scrap into UF_6, nor has it informed the Agency that it has built any new facilities for such a purpose (para. 58).

C.3. Centrifuge research and development, manufacturing and inventory

21. No enriched uranium has been accumulated through enrichment R&D activities, and Iran's enrichment R&D with and without uranium has been conducted using centrifuges within the limits defined in the JCPOA (paras 32-42).

22. Iran has provided declarations to the Agency of its production and inventory of centrifuge rotor tubes and bellows and permitted the Agency to verify the items in the inventory (para. 80.1). The Agency has conducted continuous monitoring, including through the use of containment and surveillance measures, and verified that the declared equipment has been used for the production of rotor tubes and bellows to manufacture centrifuges only for the activities specified in the JCPOA (para. 80.2). Iran has not produced any IR-1 centrifuges to replace those that have been damaged or failed (para. 62).

23. All declared rotor tubes, bellows and rotor assemblies have been under continuous monitoring by the Agency, including those rotor tubes and bellows manufactured since Implementation Day (para. 70). Iran has manufactured rotor tubes using carbon fibre that has been sampled and tested by the Agency, all of which has been subject to Agency containment and surveillance measures.[22,23]

D. Transparency measures

24. Iran has continued to permit the Agency to use on-line enrichment monitors and electronic seals which communicate their status within nuclear sites to Agency inspectors, and to facilitate the automated collection of Agency measurement recordings registered by installed measurement devices (para. 67.1). Iran has issued long-term visas to Agency inspectors designated for Iran as requested by the Agency, provided proper working space for the Agency at nuclear sites and facilitated the use of working space at locations near nuclear sites in Iran (para. 67.2).

25. Iran has continued to permit the Agency to monitor — through measures agreed with Iran, including containment and surveillance measures — that all uranium ore concentrate (UOC) produced in Iran or obtained from any other source is transferred to the Uranium Conversion Facility (UCF) at Esfahan (para. 68). Iran also provided the Agency with all information necessary to enable the Agency to verify the production of UOC and the inventory of UOC produced in Iran or obtained from any other source (para. 69).

[22] Decision of the Joint Commission of 14 January 2016 (INFCIRC/907).
[23] GOV/2016/46, para. 18.

E. Other relevant information

26. Iran continues to provisionally apply the Additional Protocol to its Safeguards Agreement in accordance with Article 17(b) of the Additional Protocol, pending its entry into force. The Agency has continued to evaluate Iran's declarations under the Additional Protocol and to conduct complementary accesses under the Additional Protocol to sites and other locations in Iran.

27. The Agency's verification and monitoring of Iran's other JCPOA nuclear-related commitments continues, including those set out in Sections D, E, S and T of Annex I of the JCPOA.

28. During this reporting period, the Agency has not attended meetings of the Procurement Working Group of the Joint Commission (JCPOA, Annex IV — Joint Commission, para. 6.4.6).

F. Summary

29. The Agency continues to verify the non-diversion of declared nuclear material at the nuclear facilities and locations outside facilities where nuclear material is customarily used (LOFs) declared by Iran under its Safeguards Agreement. Evaluations regarding the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities for Iran remained ongoing.

30. Since Implementation Day, the Agency has been verifying and monitoring the implementation by Iran of its nuclear-related commitments under the JCPOA.

31. The Director General will continue to report as appropriate.

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General Assembly
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Item 35 (a) of the provisional agenda*
Prevention of armed conflict: prevention of armed conflict

Security Council
Seventy-second year

Letter dated 13 September 2017 from the Permanent Representative of Ukraine to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to enclose herewith a statement by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine on the organization by the Russian Federation of so-called "regional elections" in the temporarily occupied city of Sevastopol (see annex).

I would appreciate it if you could have the present letter and its annex circulated as a document of the General Assembly, under item 35 (a) of the provisional agenda, and of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Volodymyr **Yelchenko**
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

* A/72/150.

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Annex to the letter dated 13 September 2017 from the Permanent Representative of Ukraine to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

Statement by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine on the organization by the Russian Federation of so-called "regional elections" in the temporarily occupied city of Sevastopol

Ukraine strongly condemns the organization by the Russian Federation on 10 September 2017 in the territory of the temporarily occupied city of Sevastopol (Autonomous Republic of Crimea) illegal "elections of the governor", "by-election of a deputy of the legislative assembly of the city of Sevastopol", as well as "by-election of deputies of certain municipalities" of this city.

We consider such actions by the Kremlin as a continuation of gross violations by the Russian Federation of state sovereignty and territorial integrity of Ukraine.

We emphasize that any steps aimed at legitimizing the illegal occupation of part of the sovereign territory of Ukraine have no legal consequences regarding the constitutionally assigned status of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol as part of the territory of Ukraine.

Holding of illegal elections in the city of Sevastopol by the Russian Federation is yet another violation of basic norms and principles of international law, enshrined in the UN Charter as well as UN General Assembly Resolution "Territorial Integrity of Ukraine" A/RES/68/262 of 27 March 2017, UN General Assembly Resolution "Situation of human rights in the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol (Ukraine)" A/RES/71/205 of 19 December 2016, the 1975 CSCE Helsinki Final Act, the 1994 Budapest Memorandum, obligations of the Russian Federation under multilateral and bilateral international treaties.

The results of these so called "elections" are null and void. The illegal status of any official or body, elected or appointed in confrontation of the legislation of Ukraine, as well as any acts issued by such officials or bodies, is defined by article 9 of the Law of Ukraine "On Securing the Rights and Freedoms of Citizens and the Legal Regime on the Temporarily occupied territory of Ukraine".

We underline that all persons, who participated in preparation and holding of illegal elections on the sovereign territory of Ukraine will be held accountable according to the legislation of Ukraine.

Ukraine calls upon all foreign states and international organizations to state clearly about their non-recognition of so called elections in the temporarily occupied city of Sevastopol, to maintain no contacts with members of local occupation administration neither at bilateral level, nor within multilateral forums, and to step up consolidated pressure on the Russian Federation, including by expanding sanctions with the purpose of making it to return into the international legal field, to stop its illegal occupation of a part of Ukraine's sovereign territory, to cease carrying out acts of armed aggression in Donbas, and to withdraw occupation troops from the territory of our state.